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Introduction 
Interest in the causes and consequences of low pay is, understandably, 
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primarily focused on the mechanisms which bring about social exclusion and their 
immediate effects on inequality and poverty. There are, however, lifetime 
consequences of employment in low paying jobs which result in exclusion of certain 
categories of employees from employer provided occupational pension schemes. The 
effects of this exclusion will not be felt by individuals in these groups until it is 
impossible, or too late, for them to make their own pension arrangements. In these 
circumstances a significant minority of employees who work in low paid jobs may be 
almost totally dependent on the State for an income during old age. If the social 
exclusion which many of them suffer during their working lifetime is not to continue 
into old age it is critical that the State should put in place arrangements, either in its 
own pension schemes or through private schemes, which will provide an adequate 
income for the elderly. 
A strong commitment to social solidarity, high fertility rates, and long-term 
economic growth over the last half century or so have ensured that most States in 
Europe developed pension systems which resulted in dramatic reductions in poverty 
among the elderly in the two decades after World War II. Despite some economic and 
social difficulties in the 1970s and 1980s most governments in Europe have continued 
to emphasise the importance of social solidarity and the need for the elderly to share 
in the benefits of continuing economic growth. Now circumstances are beginning to 
change. Fertility rates are falling, Europe's population is projected to age 
significantly in the next twenty years or so, and the commitment to social solidarity is 
threatened by conservative ideologies which prescribe a very limited role for the 
State. If action is not taken soon to address the ageing problem there is a distinct 
possibility that population ageing and reductions in social security benefits could lead 
to the re-emergence of levels of poverty among the elderly in Europe and the United 
States which have not been seen for a generation or more (see Delhausse, Perelman, 
and Pestieau (1996)). Even in countries like Ireland where the demographic profile of 
the population is more favourable than in other countries, there is a possibility of an 
increase in poverty among the elderly. The ESRI survey of poverty in the 1990s by 
Callan, Nolan, Whelan, Whelan, and Williams (1996) shows that an increasing 
proportion of households headed by a pensioner are living in poverty. The main 
reason for this is that State pension benefits have not been indexed in line with 
increases in earnings in recent years. 
Economists often treat pensions as a form of deferred pay. However, it is clear 
from surveys of pension coverage that there are certain groups of employees who are 
far less likely than other groups to benefit from deferred pay arrangements. It is also 
clear that there is a very strong interaction between pay during the working lifetime 
and membership of an occupational pension scheme. Since belonging or not 
belonging to such a scheme will ultimately decide eligibility for an occupational 
pension it is necessary to investigate what factors determine pension entitlement. 
There are two main theories of pay determination which claim to explain the 
interaction between present and deferred pay. The theory of compensating pay 
differentials suggests that employees with a preference for future over present 
consumption can trade off lower wages now in return for deferred pay in the form of a 
pension in the future. The theory of segmented labour markets suggests that 
differences in rates of time preference have limited influence on membership of 
occupational pension schemes because employees are constrained in the exercise of 
their preferences by the structural characteristics of the industry in yvhich they work 
and its employment practices. Segmentation theory predicts that it is the kind of jobs 
which employers offer that will determine membership of occupational pension 
schemes. 
Competitive labour market theory suggests that in the first case workforce 
characteristics (supply side variables) will be important determinants of whether 
employees belong to occupational pension schemes. Segmented labour market theory 
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suggests that in the second case demand side variables such as industry, duration of 
employment, type of employment (full-time/part-time), degree of unionisation, sex 
composition of the workforce, and size of employer are likely to be the important 
determinants of pension entitlement (see Ghilarducci (1992, pp. 59-60)). 
Elliott (1991, p. 313) points out that the competitive theory of pension 
provision implies that "the employer's only concern is with the level, not the 
composition, of compensation." Employees who wish to join an occupational pension 
scheme will finance it by contributing part of their current pay towards the cost of a 
future pension. The competitive theory, therefore, suggests that wages and pensions 
are substitutes and that the coefficient of a pension entitlement variable in a wage 
equation ought to be negative. 
Ghilarducci (1992, pp. 59-60) notes that under segmented labour market 
theory firms in sectors with the worst jobs (typified by high turnover, low pay and 
atypical employment) do not compensate for poor terms and conditions of 
employment by providing generous pension plans while firms in sectors with the best 
jobs (typified by low turnover, high pay, and permanent employment) attract workers 
by providing good terms and conditions of employment which include generous 
pension plans. Pension coverage will therefore be strongly influenced by industry of 
employment. Where labour markets are segmented pension entitlement will be 
poorest in sectors offering the worst jobs. Segmented labour market theory, therefore, 
suggests that pensions and wages are complements and that the coefficient of a 
pension entitlement variable will depend on the sector in which someone is employed. 
Our objective in this paper is to investigate which of the main theories of pay 
determination best explain membership of occupational pension schemes. We will 
begin by describing our data and will present a series of cross tabulations of pension 
coverage (which we also refer to as pension entitlement) on age, sex, occupation, 
industry, and earnings. Next, we will outline our tests of competitive and dual labour 
market models and of a four sector segmentation model which we have adapted for 
work with Irish data. Finally, we will consider some of the implications of our 
results for the development of the national pension system in the light of the recent 
report by The Pensions Board (1998) on Securing Retirement Income. This report 
3 
proposes a framework for the future development of pension provision in Ireland. If 
its proposals are implemented in full it will represent a fundamental reform of the 
existing approach to pension provision. 
Pension Coverage 
The Living in Ireland Survey, the Irish element of the European Community 
Household Panel survey, provides data for Ireland for 1994 which enables us to 
explore the extent to which competitive and segmented labour market hypotheses can 
account for individual pension entitlement. The survey provides data for 4,048 
households. The response rate for the survey was 62.5 per cent of valid addresses 
contacted. The responding households were reweighted for analysis to correct for the 
individual nature of the sampling frame (the electoral register) and for non-response 
bias. This ensures that the sample for analysis agrees with the Labour Force Survey in 
terms of the number of adults in the household, urban/rural location, socio-economic 
group, and age of household head. The sample households contained 3,300 employees 
for whom information is available on pension entitlements and personal and 
employment characteristics. 
Table 1 shows the age distribution of employees with pension entitlement in 
1994 classified by age and sex. Just over half of all employees have pension 
entitlement and this is positively related to age. Less than one-fifth of those aged 
under 25 were covered by a pension scheme. The proportion covered increases to over 
half for the age cohort 25-34 and to two-thirds for those aged 35-44. It stabilises at 
this level for the remaining cohorts in the ';VOrking ages 45-54 and 55-64 and falls to 
· about one-seventh for those aged 65 and over who continue to work after normal 
retirement age. There are significant differences in the pattern of coverage for men 
and women. Almost three-fifths of men have a pension entitlement while less than 
two-fifths of women have. Entitlement for both men and women increases from a low 
level for the youngest age cohort to around 50 per cent for the cohort aged 25-34. It 
increases to around 75 per cent for men but falls back to around 40 per cent for 
women for the remaining working age cohorts. 
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Table I: Percentage of Employees with Pension Entitlement by Age and Sex, 1994 
Age Per cent with pension entitlement 
All Men Women 
under 25 16.8 13.6 20.4 
25-34 52.1 53.9 50.0 
35-44 64.6 74.4 47.3 
45-54 64.2 79.2 37.1 
55-64 63.7 75.6 42.1 
65+ 13.5 30.6 0.0 
All 51.0 58.7 39.8 
Source: Living in Ireland Survey 1994 
The percentage of employees with pension entitlement classified by major 
occupational group is shown in Table 2. There are significant differences in 
entitlement by occupational group. Agricultural and sales workers have very low 
pension coverage with only 20 and 27 per cent respectively belonging to a pension 
scheme. Producers and transport and communication workers have moderate coverage 
ranging from 44 to 50 per cent. Professional workers have good coverage with almost 
70 per cent having pension entitlement. 
Table 2: Percentage of Employees with Pension Entitlement by Occupational 
Grau , 1994 
occupational group 
agricultural workers 
producers etc. 
Labourers 
transport & communication workers 
clerical workers 
sales workers 
service workers 
professional etc. workers 
Others 
All 
Source: Living in Ireland Survey 1994 
% with pension entitlement 
20.1 
44.2 
43.4 
50.2 
57.1 
27.5 
33.3 
69.6 
85.7 
51.0 
Coverage classified by the major industrial sector in which the employee is 
working is shown in Table 3. There is considerable variation in coverage by 
industry. The lowest coverage rates are in personal services, agriculture and retail 
services where only 9, 16, and 17 per cent of employees respectively have pension 
entitlement. Moderate coverage is provided in the building and other production 
sectors where approaching half of the employees have a pension entitlement. The 
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highest coverage occurs in the public administration sector with almost 95 per cent of 
employees belonging to a pension plan. 
The percentage of employees in each decile of the earnings distribution who 
are covered by a pension scheme is shown in Table 4. There is a very strong positive 
relationship between the percentage covered in each decile and the level of earnings. 
Employees in the bottom two deciles of the earnings distribution have virtually no 
pension entitlement while virtually all of those in the top two deciles have such an 
entitlement. In the remaining six deciles the percentage of employees with a pension 
entitlement increases steadily with earnings from 20 per cent for those in the third 
decile to almost 78 per cent for those in the eighth decile. 
Table 3: Percentage of Employees with Pension Entitlement by Sector, 1994 
sector % with pension entitlement 
agriculture 
Building 
other production 
Wholesale 
Retail 
insurance, finance & business services 
transport, communication & storage 
professional services 
teaching etc. 
Health 
public administration 
personal services 
Others 
All 
Source: Living in Ireland Survey 1994 
16.3 
46.6 
47.3 
37.2 
17.0 
70.1 
71.1 
39.8 
76.0 
60.9 
94.2 
9.2 
31.1 
51.0 
Table 4: Employees Ranked by Hourly Gross Earnings Showing the Percentage with 
Pension Entitlements by Deciles, 1994 
Decile 
First 
Second 
Third 
Fourth 
Fifth 
Sixth 
Seventh 
Eight 
Ninth 
Tenth 
Source: Living in Ireland Survey 1994 
% with pension entitlements 
3.2 
6.7 
20.3 
41.4 
51.6 
57.7 
72.4 
77.8 
88.9 
88.7 
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The· variations in employees' pension entitlements classified by age, sex, 
occupation, industry, and level of earnings are striking. Are these variations the 
product of differences in the age composition of the labour force across occupations 
and sectors or are the variations produced by differences in industrial sector with 
pension entitlement determined by industry of employment? A multivariate approach 
in which the effects of these and other factors on pension entitlement are allowed for 
is needed to identify the influence of employee preferences associated with the 
competitive model and job characteristics associated with the segmented labour 
market model (see Piere (1970) and Doeringer and Piere (1971)). 
Tests of Competitive and Dual Segmentation Models 
In testing competitive and segmented labour market models of pension 
entitlement we will follow the approach used in our earlier work on earnings (Hughes 
and Nolan, 1997) and pensions (Hughes and Nolan, 1996). We begin by testing the 
relationship between earnings and pension entitlement. We estimate regression 
models for our sample of employees which include variables that are key 
determinants of earnings according to competitive and segmentation theories. In 
these regressions the dependent variable is the log of average gross hourly earnings of 
employees. The independent variables are those suggested by competitive and 
segmented models to be important determinants of earnings: age, sex, marital status, 
education, occupation, industry, type of employment (part-time/full-time), and trade 
union membership. We also include a pension entitlement variable to test whether 
earnings and pension entitlement are postively related, as the segmentation theory 
suggests, or negatively related, as the competitive theory predicts. 
We recognise that the test of the competitive theory is an imperfect one. 
Ideally we would like to test whether the total compensation packages which 
employers offer to workers of equal productivity are equalised over the working 
lifetime. The most straightforward way to test this would be to use Schiller and 
Weiss's (1980) approach in which the wage rate in the standard earnings function: 
logW= a+bX 
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is replaced by total compensation CW + P), where W is the wage rate, X is a vector of 
productive characteristics and P is the value of the occupational pension. Making the 
substitution and rearranging gives: 
log W = a +bX -clog (l+p) 
where p = P/W is the ratio of the value of the occupational pension contribution to 
the wage. If wages and pensions are perfect substitutes, as predicted by the 
competitive theory, the elasticity of the wage with respect to the pension wage ratio 
should be equal to -1. Unfortunately, our data set does not provide any information on 
the value of each employee's occupational entitlement. In the absence of such data 
our strategy is to use a set of control variables which are believed to affect the lifetime 
values of both pay and pension entitlement and to insert a dichotomous variable for 
pension coverage. The competitive theory predicts that the coefficient on the pension 
coverage variable should be negative because members of pension schemes who 
receive the same total compensation and who have the same personal characteristics 
as employees who are not members should have lower earnings. Segmentation 
theory predicts that the coefficient of the pension coverage variable will be positive 
because employees in good, well paid, jobs will be more likely to be members of 
occupational pension schemes than employees in poor, badly paid, jobs. 
Following our earlier work we first test a basic dual version of the 
segmentation model rather crudely, by dividing major industry groups into those 
which would generally be thought of as in the primary versus the secondary sector. 
The relevant allocation is shown in Table 5, and in the 1994 survey this would 
categorise 34% of employees as in the secondary sector. According to the dual 
version of segmented labour market theory the primary and secondary sectors should 
differ in terms of the sex composition of the workforce, unionisation, the proportion 
working part-time, the provision of fringe benefits such as pensions, the existence of 
earnings ladders, and the duration of employment. Table 6 shows that the secondary 
sector does have significantly higher proportions of part-time employees and lower 
proportions of trade union members than the primary sector (though not many more 
female employees). It also has fewer with pension entitlement. Evidence from a 
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similar survey carried out by the ESRI in 1987 reported in Hughes and Nolan (1996) 
also showed the secondary sector (defined in this way) to have fewer employees on 
incremental scales than the primary sector, as well as considerably less stability of 
employment (with an average length of job of only five years compared with more 
than eight years in the primary sector). 
Table 5: Allocation of occupational and industrial groups in Ireland to primary 
and secondary labour market segments 
Primary sector 
Industrial group 
Other production 
Insurance 
Transport 
Professional service 
Teaching 
Health 
Public administration 
Secondary sector 
Agriculture 
Building and Construction 
Wholesale 
Retail 
Personal service 
Other industries 
Hence, our rough division of industries into primary and secondary sectors 
looks to be consistent with segmentation arguments that the primary sector offers 
employees more stable jobs with good conditions and terms of employment, while the 
secondary sector offers more precarious employment, with few fringe benefits and 
limited opportunities for advancement up the earnings ladder. 
Table 6: Characteristics of primary and secondary labour markets in Ireland 
Sector % % union % % with % on incre-
female members part- pension mental scale 
time entitlement (1987) 
Primary 40.0 52.9 4.6 64.1 42.8 
Secondary 41.9 19.7 11.6 25.7 18.5 
Source: Living in Ireland Survey 1994, Hughes and Nolan (1996). 
Average 
length 
of job 
(1987) 
8.5 
5.3 
Table 7 presents three earnings equations for all employees in the 1994 Living 
m Ireland Survey. Equation 1 explains almost two thirds of the variation in 
employees' average gross hourly earnings. The number of years an employee has 
been employed has the expected positive effect on earnings although it decreases as 
the number of years employed increases. Time spent out of employment has the 
expected negative effect on earnings with the effect declining as the number of years 
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out of employment increases. Being female reduces earnings relative to being male, 
while for both sexes being married increases earnings relative to being single. 
The omitted occupation and industry variables are "labourer" and "other 
production". It will be seen from Table 5 that labouring occupations are allocated to 
the secondary sector and that other production industries are allocated to the primary 
sector. Hence, earnings in primary sector occupations should be higher relative to the 
omitted occupation variable while earnings in secondary sector industries should be 
lower relative to those in the other production sector. These hypotheses are generally 
borne out by our regression results. Earnings in the primary sector occupation groups 
producer, clerical, professional, and other occupations are higher relative to labouring 
occupations. In addition, the higher coefficients of the professional and other 
occupation groups conform with prior expectations about the relationships between 
earnings for these occupations and such occupations as clerical and sales which 
generally require lower level educational qualifications. The coefficients of the 
industry variables in equation 1 also generally accord with expectations generated by 
the segmented model. Earnings in agriculture, building, wholesale, retail, personal 
service, and other industries, which are in the secondary sector, are lower than in the 
omitted other production sector. Being a trade union member increases earnings and 
being part-time also does so. The latter result is somewhat surprising as we expected 
the association between earnings and part-time employment to be negative. Finally, 
having a pension entitlement is positively related to the level of earnings - the higher 
an employee's earnings the more likely that he or she will have a pension entitlement. 
This suggests that earnings and pensions are complements, as the segmented model 
predicts, rather than substitutes, as the competitive model suggests. 
Equation 2 in Table 7 exammes the effect on our results of including 
education variables which human capital theory predicts will have a strong effect in 
explaining 
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Table 7: OLS regression of earnings level on pension entitlement and other variables 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
constant 1.14 32.66 0.94 22.90 -0.81 0.98 
age 0.05 11.93 
age2 -0.01 9.56 
years employed 0.03 12.20 0.03 15.03 
years employed2 -0.05 9.62 -0.05 10.44 
years out of -0.02 4.61 -0.01 2.29 
employment 
years out of 
employment2 
0.04 9.62 0.02 2.06 
female -0.07 3.42 -0.08 3.64 -0.06 2.94 
married man 0.17 7.41 0.14 6.68 0.17 7.06 
married woman 0.09 3.71 0.07 3.10 0.06 2.28 
group certificate 0.06 2.07 0.14 4.60 
intermediate certificate - 0.13 4.57 0.23 7.71 
leaving certificate 0.22 7.70 0.37 12.99 
diploma/third level 0.26 7.97 0.45 13.74 
university degree 0.57 15.70 0.92 29.77 
Occupational Group: 
agricultural worker 0.08 1.92 - 0.21 3.23 
producer etc. 0.11 3.35 0.10 3.06 
transport etc. 0.02 0.51 0.01 0.21 
· clerical 0.27 7.23 0.18 4.91 
sales 0.13 3.00 0.04 1.06 
service 0.08 1.92 0.02 0.46 
professional, etc. 0.56 14.67 0.32 8.21 
other 0.49 11.73 0.34 8.24 
Industrial Sector: 
agriculture -0.38 6.12 -0.37 6.19 
building -0.11 -0.09 2.96 
wholesale -0.07 2.13 -0.04 1.20 
retail -0.24 7.01 -0.20 5.90 
insurance 0.09 2.77 0.09 2.63 
transport -0.03 0.89 -0.03 0.97 
professional -0.14 2.18 -0.20 3.26 
teaching 0.31 9.37 0.18 5.45 
health -0.10 3.30 -0.06 1.94 
public administration -0.13 4.41 -0.11 3.80 
personal service -0.29 8.59 -0.24 7.33 
other -0.11 3.38 -0.10 7.33 
part-time 0.13 4.32 0.13 7.33 0.01 0.36 
trade union member 0.12 7.67 0.14 9.17 0.18 11.05 
pension entitlement 0.27 15.12 0.24 14.02 0.34 19.01 
number of observations 3,288 3,270 3,270 
AdjR2 0.65 0.68 0.59 
F 200.89 197.81 367.60 
Std. Error ofregression 0.37 0.35 0.39 
Source: See text 
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variation in earnmgs. The omitted variable in this case is no formal education 
qualifications. As human capital theory predicts, an increase in the level of education 
has a strong positive influence on earnings. Thus, employees with low level 
educational qualifications have higher earnings than those who have no qualifications 
while those with high level qualifications have the highest level of earnings relative to 
those without qualifications. The inclusion of the education variables improves the 
performance of the regression. It increases the variation in earnings explained from 65 
to 68 per cent. Their impact on the coefficients of the other variables is noticeable but 
relatively minor in most cases. In the case of the pension entitlement variable, for 
example, the coefficient is reduced from 0.27 to 0.24 but it remains highly significant, 
as indicated by its t-value. 
Equation 3 shows what happens if the occupation and industry variables are 
omitted from the regression. The percentage of the variance explained falls from 68 to 
59 per cent so that the overall performance of the regression deteriorates. In addition 
the coefficient of the part-time variable becomes insignificant while the coefficents 
and significance of the trade union and pension entitlement variables increases. Thus, 
these variables "pick up" some of the explanatory power associated with the excluded 
segmentation variables. 
Pension Entitlement a17d Labour Market Segmentation 
Our regression results suggest that further consideration should be given to the 
segmentation model's arguments about pension entitlement. In this section we will 
consider the explanatory power of these arguments by directly testing the relationship 
between pension entitlement and dual and multi-segment versions of the segmentation 
model. We begin by testing the two-sector version of the model. Table 8 presents the 
results of three legit regressions of the probability of having pension entitlement. 
The dependent variable in these regressions is the dichotomy "has/has not a pension 
entitlement". It takes a value of 1 for those who have an entitlement and O for those 
who do not. The independent variables are generally the same as those included in 
the earnings equations in Table 7. 
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In equation 1 in Table 8, pension entitlement is strongly associated with 
increasing age. The probability of having pension entitlement rises with age but at a 
decreasing rate as the stock of employees who need to make such arrangements falls. 
While the coefficient on the female variable is negative it is not significantly different 
from zero. This contrasts with our earlier finding that being female did result in a 
lower probability of having a pension entitlement, as suggested by the segmentation 
model (see Hughes and Nolan, 1996). Being married and female results in a lower 
pension entitlement whereas being married and male leads to a higher entitlement. 
These results accord with our expectation that marital status should have a different 
effect for men and women. The primary sector occupation variables have the expected 
signs relative to the omitted group "labourers". Relatively, earnings are higher in 
clerical, professional and other occupations or are not significantly different from the 
control group in the case of producer and transport occupations. Similarly, the 
coefficients of the industry groups agriculture, retailing, personal service, and other 
industries in the secondary sector are lower than in the primary sector control group. 
Finally, trade union membership has a strong positive influence on pension 
entitlement. Overall, the influence of the segmentation variables in equation 1 
appears to be exercised in the direction predicted by the segmented labour market 
model. Industries which have relatively stable product demand have a higher 
probability of offering their employees a pension entitlement than industries in the 
secondary sector where product demand is more uncertain. The explanatory power 
of the first regression equation in Table 8 is quite high with almost 81 per cent of the 
individual cases of pension entitlement being predicted correctly. 
As noted earlier in connection with the dual version of the segmented model, 
part-time workers are more likely to be found in the secondary sector while high pay 
is associated with the primary sector. In equation 2 in Table 8, therefore, we include 
two variables, part-time employment and hourly earnings, which help to differentiate 
between employment in the two sectors. The inclusion of these variables increases 
the explanatory power of the regression from 81 to 85 per cent of cases predicted 
correctly. The coefficient of the hourly earnings variable suggests that the higher the 
employee's earnings the greater the chance that he or she will have a pension 
entitlement. The coefficient of the part-time variable suggests that working less than 
the standard number of hours is likely to result in a significant reduction in the 
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probability of having pension entitlement. The inclusion of the part-time and 
earnings variables reduces the coefficients of the married woman variable and all but 
two of the occupation variables to insignificance. However, almost all of the industry 
variables which were significant in equation 1 remain significant in equation 2. This 
suggests that industry is a more important determinant of pension entitlement than 
occupation. This accords with an implication of the segmented model that since 
firms in the primary sector generally have higher recruitment and training costs they 
are more likely to offer fringe benefits such as pensions as an incentive for employees 
to remain with them. 
Equations 1 and 2 in Table 8 show that pension entitlement is positively 
related to age. In order to test whether age or labour market experience, with which 
of course age is closely related, is the more useful predictor of pension entitlement we 
substitute employment experience variables in equation 3 for the age variables. The 
effect of employment experience on the probability of having a pension entitlement is 
little different from age. However, it is preferable to use the employment experience 
variables in the regression instead of age to allow them to have a direct impact on the 
dependent variable rather than an indirect effect through the age variable. 
A Four Sector Segmentation Model 
The two sector segmented labour market model is a simple dualist 
version mainly used for expository purposes. More advanced treatments of the 
model posit multiple segments (see Gordon, Edwards, and Reich (1982) and McNabb 
and Whitfield (1998)) rather than two segments consisting of primary and secondary 
labour markets. In earlier work on earnings and labour market segmentation in Ireland 
(Hughes and Nolan (1997)), we tried to take account of this diversity by applying 
Gordon's (1986) procedure for the allocation of industry and occupation groups to 
four labour market segments: independent primary professional and technical, 
independent primary craft, subordinate primary, and secondary. Details of how the 
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Table 8: Estimates ofLogit Model for Probability of Having Pension Entitlement 
Variable Equation 
(1) (2) (3) 
Constant -6.14 10.01 -7.70 10.01 -5.89 16.12 
age 0.21 6.83 0.10 2.75 
age2 -0.01 5.75 -0.01 2.25 
years employed 0.08 4.25 
years employed2 -0.10 2.55 
Years out of employment - -0.12 4.04 
Years out of employment2 - 0.37 2.98 
Female -0.14 0.84 0.15 0.84 0.19 1.07 
married man 0.88 5.48 0.44 2.55 0.31 1.79 
married woman -0.61 3.64 -0.57 0.19 -0.35 1.83 
Occupational Group: 
Agricultural worker 0.60 1.07 0.49 0.81 0.44 0.71 
producer, etc. -0.09 0.36 -0.46 1.93 -0.55 2.26 
transport, etc. -0.44 1.50 -0.54 2.45 -0.65 2.15 
clerical worker 1.09 3.97 0.33 1.13 0.24 0.83 
sales worker 0.57 1.87 0.19 0.59 -0.10 0.33 
service worker 0.08 0.26 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.06 
Professional, etc. 1.54 5.61 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.04 
Other 1.74 5.38 0.27 0.77 0.19 0.53 
Industrial Sector: 
Agriculture -1.87 3.60 -1.19 2.13 -1.28 2.26 
Building 0.29 1.41 0.46 2.14 0.43 1.96 
Wholesale -0.20 0.87 -0.11 0.45 -0.15 0.62 
Retail -0.90 3.45 -0.38 1.37 -0.51 
insurance 0.79 3.45 0.62 2.44 0.62 2.40 
transport 0.71 3.21 0.73 3.08 0.72 3.00 
Professional -0.37 0.87 -0.11 0.23 -0.16 0.31 
Teaching 0.38 1.60 -0.19 0.73 -0.14 0.52 
Health 0.58 2.76 0.93 3.91 0.95 3.90 
public administration 2.28 7.50 2.95 8.19 2.92 8.02 
personal service -1.36 4.52 -0.82 2.48 -0.85 2.57 
Other -0.75 3.27 -0.48 1.94 -0.54 2.19 
trade union member 1.99 18.84 1.53 13.39 1.50 12.92 
part-time -4.53 9.56) -4.54 9.43 
hourly earnings 2.57(15.15 15.15 2.44 14.29 
number of observations 3,289 3,289 3,289 
% of cases correctly 80.7 84.9 84.8 
predicted 
-2 Log-likelihood 2,713.9 2,288.8 2,251.1 
employees in our sample are allocated to these segments are given in Hughes and 
Nolan (1997). 
Table 9 compares the distribution of the workforce across the four segments in Ireland 
and the United States. The distribution across the four sectors is remarkably similar 
in the two countries. About a quarter of employees in both countries work in the 
secondary sector, around a third work in the subordinate primary sector and a quarter 
and a tenth respectively work in the independent primary professional and technical 
and independent primary craft sectors. 
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The characteristics of the four sectors in Ireland in terms of gender, 
unionisaton, type of employment, pension entitlement, earnings ladders, and duration 
of employment are shown in Table 10. As described in the literature on labour 
market segmentation the secondary sector has a higher percentage of women in its 
labour force than sectors in the primary labour market and a higher percentage of part-
time employment. In addition it has lower levels than the primary sectors of 
unionisation and pension entitlement and lower percentages of its employees on 
incremental scales and in jobs with a long duration of employment. 
Table 9: Distribution of employment in four labour market segments in Ireland 
in 1994 and in the United States in 1987 
Labour market segment 
Independent primary 
Ireland 
(%) 
United States 
(%) 
professional and technical 29.4 29.3 
Independent primary craft 11. 4 10. 8 
Subordinate primary 30.9 33.9 
Secondary 28.3 26.0 
Source: Living in Ireland Survey 1994 and Fichtenbaum, Gyimah-Brempong, and Olson 
(1994). 
Table 10: Percentage female, unionised, part-time, with pension entitlement and 
average length of job in four labour market segments in Ireland in 1994 
% female % union % part-time % with 
members (18 hours) pension 
Independent primary 40.2 45.9 4.3 
professional and technical 
Independent primary craft 13.3 43.5 0.8 
Subordinate primary 38.2 55.7 3.5 
Secondary 55.9 20.8 16.2 
Source: Living in Ireland Survey 1994, Hughes and Nolan (1996). 
entitle-
ment 
70.0 
47.4 
63.6 
18.9 
Average 
length of 
job 
(1987) 
9.95 
7.43 
7.05 
6.16 
The results of testing the four segment version of the model are given in Table 
11. Being female increases an employee's chance of having a pension entitlement 
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Table 11: Logit regression of pension entitlement on marital staus, years in and out 
of the employment, trade union membership, hourly earnings and labour market segment 
Variable Whole sample 
Constant -6.49 
(22.49) 
Female 0.41 
(2.59) 
Married man 0.22 
(1.33) 
Married woman -.30 
(1.68) 
Years employed 0.09 
(4.95) 
Years employed2 -0.12 
(3.11) 
Years out of employment -0.12 
(4.13) 
Years out of employment2 0.37 
(3.20) 
Part time -4.12 
(8.59) 
Trade union member 1.41 
(13.45) 
Hourly earnings 2.45 
(16.02) 
Independent primary prof. & 0.68 
technical (4.21) 
Independent primary craft 0.39 
(2.25) 
Subordinate primary 0.99 
(7.18) 
No. of observations 3,289 
% of cases predicted correctly 82.9 
-2 Log likelihood 2,457.9 
relative to being male. This result is unexpected as segmentation theory suggests the 
opposite. Being a married man or a married woman does not effect the probability of 
pension entitlement relative to being a single man. Employment experience, as 
measured by years in and out of employment, has the expected positive impact on 
pension entitlement. The more years an employee has been employed the greater the 
likelihood that he or she will have a pension entitlement. However, the squared 
employment experience variable shows that the rate of increase diminishes over time. 
Conversely, the more years an employee has been without a job the greater is the 
probability of not having a pension entitlement. Being a part-time worker has a 
strong negative impact on pension entitlement while being a trade union member and 
having high hourly earnings have strong positive effects on entitlement. In the case of 
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the segmentation variables the reference group is the secondary sector and we expect 
the coefficients of the primary sector variables to be higher relative to this control 
group. The results in Table 11 show that this expectation is borne out with all three 
coefficients of the primary sector variables being higher relative to the secondary 
sector. 
The four sector regression results presented in Table 11 contain less than half 
the explanatory variables used in the two sector results in Table 9 but the explanatory 
power is greater than that for equation 1 in Table 9, with 83 per cent of the cases 
being predicted correctly versus 81 per cent. 
Predicted Pension Entitlement Probabilities 
The implications of the results in Table 11 for the average employee's 
probability of having a pension entitlement if employed in jobs with characteristics 
typical of primary or secondary sectors can be considered by using the four sector 
regression equation to predict the probability of having such an entitlement. This is 
done in Table 12. As a benchmark we use an employee who has worked for 15 
years, earns £5 per hour in a full time job, is a trade union member and works in the 
subordinate primary sector. This employee has 71 chances out of 100 of having a 
pension entitlement. If the employee works in the independent primary professional 
and technical sector the chances are reduced to 64 and to 57 if working in the 
independent primary craft sector. However, if the employee works in the secondary 
sector the chances of having a pension entitlement fall from 71 to 47 in a 100. 
Hence, an employee working in the subordinate primary sector has a 50 per cent 
greater chance of having a pension entitlement as someone with exactly the same 
characteristics working in the secondary sector. 
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Table 12: Predicted probability of having a pension entitlement based on results for four 
sector segmented labour market model. 
Characteristics Predicted probability 
Benchmark: employed 15 years, earns £5 per 
hour, full time, trade union member, working 0.71 
in subordinate primary sector 
as benchmark except: 
works in independent primary professional 0.64 
sector 
works in independent primary craft sector 0.57 
works in secondary sector O .4 7 
Conclusions and Implications for Pensions Policy 
The Living in Ireland Survey data for 1994 for Ireland has allowed us to test 
the power of the two main labour market theories to explain pension entitlement. 
The competitive and segmented labour market theories lead to conflicting hypotheses 
about the relationship between earnings and pension entitlement. The competitive 
theory suggests that individual preferences for current over future consumption will 
determine whether an employee is likely to have pension entitlement. In this case the 
coefficient on a pension entitlement variable in an earnings equation should be 
negative, reflecting the fact that all other things being equal earnings will be reduced 
to pay for the pension. 
The segmentation theory emphasises the employer's role in making provision 
for a pension scheme for the employees. The labour market divides into a number of 
different segments according to the characteristics of product demand curves. In the 
dual version of the model there is a primary sector in which good jobs are generally 
provided and a secondary sector in which the jobs offered are mainly of poor quality. 
Employers in the primary sector have stable product demand curves so continuity of 
supply of labour of the quantity and quality they desire is important to them. Having 
an occupational pension scheme gives them an instrument with which they can reward 
employees who give long service to the firm or punish employees who quit the firm's 
employment. Such an instrument is, generally, not required by employers in the 
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secondary sector because the demand for their products is less stable and they need to 
be able to hire and fire staff-in response to fluctuations in demand. The segmentation 
theory predicts that having pension entitlement will be positively related to the level 
of earnings. Hence, in an earnings equation the coefficient of a pension entitlement 
variable should be positive. 
Our tests of these two theories favour the segmentation model over the 
competitive model. The coefficient of the pension entitlement variable in our 
earnings equation is positive and significant, contrary to the competitive hypothesis. 
Legit regressions testing both dual and multi-sector versions of the segmentation 
model show that pension coverage conforms to the patterns predicted by the 
segmentation model. In the four sector version of the model, those employed in 
primary sectors of the labour market are far more likely to have a pension entitlement 
than those working in the secondary sector. An analysis of the factors which are 
likely to result in differences in pension entitlement shows that an employee in the 
subordinate primary sector has a 50 per cent greater chance of having a pension 
entitlement than an employee working in the secondary sector. 
These results strongly suggest that most employees in the secondary sector 
and a significant minority of employees in primary sectors are excluded from 
occupational pension schemes because it is not in the interest of their employers to 
provide such schemes. Previous research, in which we were able to test only a dual 
version of the segmented labour market model, provided similar results and we 
concluded that "employers throughout the economy are unlikely to extend employer-
provided pension cover on a voluntary basis to all employees" (Hughes and Nolan, 
1996, p. 182). A recent survey of trends in occupational pension coverage provides 
evidence which supports these arguments (see Hughes and Whelan (1996)). The 
survey shows that coverage of occupational pension schemes fell from over 54 per 
cent of public and private sector employees in 1985 to 52 per cent in 1995 despite 
strenuous efforts by the pensions industry to increase coverage during those years. 
The trend in coverage in Ireland is in line with experience in other countries 
which have relied on occupational schemes to provide an earnings-related pension 
during retirement. Private sector coverage in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the 
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United States has peaked at around 50 per cent or less of the labour force. Efforts to 
push private sector coverage above 50 per cent in these countries have not been 
successful. In our view this is largely due to the existence of segmentation in the 
labour market. Labour market segmentation means that the great majority of workers 
in the secondary sector and a significant minority of workers in primary sectors will 
have to rely on the State to provide an income in retirement. The nature of their jobs, 
their low pay, and their broken employment histories make it extremely difficult for 
them to accumulate enough savings during their working lives to provide even a 
modest earnings-related supplement to the State pension. This has significant 
implications for the proposals which the Pensions Board (1998) has made recently for 
the future development of pensions policy in Ireland. 
The Pensions Board has produced a strategy for the development of the 
national pension system which has "a particular objective of bringing into 
supplementary pension coverage groups hitherto not covered such as younger people, 
lower paid and atypical workers" (Pensions Board, 1998, p. v). These are the groups 
which the segmentation model predicts are least likely to be covered by an 
occupational pension scheme. The Board argues that the best way of providing 
pension coverage for these and other groups is by introducing Personal Retirement 
Savings Accounts (PRSAs). These accounts would be similar to the Individual 
Retirement Account plans in the United States or Private Personal Pension plans in 
the United Kingdom. They would be made available to everyone regardless of 
employment status, so an employee who quits work or becomes self-employed could 
continue to make contributions to an individual retirement savings account. It will be 
mandatory for employers to provide facilities for their employees to contribute to 
PRSAs through payroll deductions if the employees wish it, but the employer will not 
be obliged to make contributions.. Significant age-related tax relief would be given 
on contributions to encourage individuals to take out PRSAs and it is envisaged that 
they would be marketed by a wide range of providers such as banks, insurance 
companies, credit unions, and the Post Office. 
Having argued that the way to increase coverage for younger people, the lower 
paid, and atypical workers is by providing PRSAs, the Board seems to expect that not 
many of them will avail of the opportunity to save for their retirement through an 
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individual savings account. It notes that such accounts have high administrative costs 
and states that: 
" Since those on lower pay are, at best, only likely to be in a position to fund a small pension 
this additional expense is likely to fall most heavily on those on lower incomes and those 
working in small employments. Based on the results of the ESRI Survey 1995, this sector 
experiences very low coverage at present and, in addition, it must be accepted that it is least 
likely to be in a position to contribute towards a supplementary pension." (Pensions Board 
(1998, p. 87)). 
Experience in the United States and the United Kingdom shows that take-up of 
individual retirement savings accounts is greatest for middle and higher income 
groups and least for low income groups (see Sabelhaus (1996). It also shows that such 
accounts are mainly used by middle and higher income groups as a tax favoured 
shelter for their savings. This means that they redistribute income from lower to 
higher income groups and that they result in little, if any, increase in national savings 
(see Engen, Gale, and Scholz ( 1996) for evidence that individual retirement accounts 
do not increase national savings and Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996) for the contrary 
view). A striking demonstration of the validity of these points was provided in the 
United States when the tax reform act of 1986 excluded high income tax payers with 
employer provided pensions from contributing to Individual Retirement Accounts and 
"contributions immediately fell by 62 per cent", as Banks (1998, p. 3) points out. 
Since the lower paid are unlikely to benefit much from the introduction of 
Personal Retirement Saving Accounts it will be necessary to ensure that the State's 
contributory and non-contributory pension benefits are set at levels which are high 
enough to prevent poverty. It is also necessary that the benefits should be indexed in 
line with increases in average earnings to ensure that the living standards of the 
elderly are maintained and that they share in any increase in living standards which 
occurs. It is encouraging that the Pensions Board recommends this should be done 
by raising the current contributory old age pension level of 28.5 per cent of average 
industrial earnings for a single person to 34 per cent over a five to ten year period, that 
a minimally acceptable income level should be maintained by indexing the pension in 
line with prices and, if circumstances permit, that the pension should be increased in 
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line with average industrial earnings to reflect the broadly based commitment in Irish 
society to social inclusion. 
If the Board's proposals to improve Social Welfare pensions are acted upon, 
lower paid workers in segmented labour markets could look forward to having a flat-
rate pension benefit which would provide a high replacement rate and an adequate 
income during retirement. Not all members of the Board are in favour of this 
proposal. In a reservation to the report the Department of Finance representative 
argues that raising the State pension to the level recommended is not necessary to 
prevent poverty and that to do so would lead to a significant increase in costs which 
would adversely affect the public finances. The Department's representative 
expressed no reservations about the cost to the Exchequer of the proposal to introduce 
Personal Retirement Saving Accounts. In providing estimates of the long-term cost 
of improving Social Welfare pensions and current estimates of the cost of tax 
expenditures on occupational schemes the Pensions Board report leaves an impression 
that improving Social Welfare pensions is the more costly of the two main proposals 
for increasing retirement income. In view of the proposals in the report that: 
• the current tax reliefs for occupational pens10n schemes should be 
extended to Personal Retirement Saving Accounts; 
• the tax exempt contributions to these accounts should increase from a 
minimum of 15 per cent of income at age 30 to 30 per cent at age 60; 
• there should be no limit on the earnings on which contributions are 
payable; 
it is not obvious that increasing Social Welfare pension benefits would be more costly 
than the introduction of a new tax expenditure on Personal Retirement Saving 
Accounts on terms which are far more generous than the existing arrangements for 
occupational pensions. 
In advance of the preparation of a government Bill to give legislative effect to 
the proposals for PRSAs an interdepartmental working group is now considering the 
tax issues raised in the Pensions Board report. In addition, to giving careful 
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consideration to the technical issue of how these accounts should be treated for tax 
purposes, this working group should look at two broad questions: 
1. How do the long-term costs of privately provided pensions and retirement 
savings schemes compare with the costs of publicly provided pensions? 
2. What gains or losses are different income groups likely to experience if the 
proposals for PRSAs are implemented? 
Until these questions are answered it makes little sense to introduce new pension 
arrangements which risk imposing additional costs on most taxpayers and 
redistributing income from the poor to the rich. 
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